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MEDICOLEGAL PROBLEMS IN BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS
CHARLES H. RANDALL, JR.*
FOREWORD
In October 1960 the Joint Blood Council, Inc., an organiza-
tion consisting of the American Medical Association, the Amer-
ican Association of Blood Banks, the American Hospital
Association, the American National Red Cross, and the American
Society of Clinical Pathologists resolved to authorize a study of
"law suits involving blood banks." W. Croft Jennings, Esquire,
of Columbia, South Carolina, a member of the Board of Di-
rectors, asked me to undertake this task. In January 1962 a pre-
liminary report was widely circulated among interested persons
for. comment, and in October of that year the final report was
published. That report is substantially as reprinted herein. Five
thousand copies were distributed among hospitals, blood banks,
and doctors, as well as others who were interested. A small
reprinting was made in February 1963 by the John Sealy
Hospital Blood Bank of the University of Texas, and in May
1963 a larger reprinting was made by the American Medical
Association. In 1967 the American Medical Association and I
authorized reprinting in volume I of the Practicing Law Insti-
tute publication Medical Malpractice.
In 1966 an unauthorized, practically verbatim, copy of this
work was published in 16 Federation of Insurance Counsel
Quarterly 9 (1966). Because of this and because of the wide
interest that has been indicated in the developing legal problems
involved in blood transfusion, I asked the Sout Carolina Law
Review to publish this article. I wish to express appreciation to
the many doctors who read the first draft and made helpful
criticisms, as well as to lawyers who were willing to send me their
office copies of the transcripts of cases in the article.
*Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law; A.B.,
LL.B., LL.M., Harvard University; Member, New York Bar, Massachusetts
Bar, South Carolina Bar.
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I. Tim Doonnm oF CHA=ABLE ImmluNrYr
While there is great diversity among the states as to the extent
to which a charity is liable for torts committed by its servants,
the trend is to hold charities liable to the same extent as other
associations. In several states, the highest court therein has
overruled retroactively decisions of long standing granting
charitable immunity. No hospital or blood bank can neglect
serious consideration of insurance against liability.
The strong trend in appellate courts in the United States to
reconsider critically the doctrine of charitable immunity has
continued during the past decade. Charitable immunity means
exemption from the application of general tort rules which, but
for the charitable character of the tort-feasor, would apply.1
Whether a charitable institution is subject to the same liability
as any other association is in this country usually a matter
within the cognizance of the state legislative or judicial power.
The rulings in the several states present a bewildering diversity;
what the law is in detail in any particular jurisdiction must be
the subject of careful research. The trend in the nation, how-
ever, is clearly to subject a charitable hospital or other medical
institution to the same rules of liability that govern other or-
ganizations. This trend is being stoutly resisted by several states
which are adhering to their previous rulings in favor of charita-
ble immunity. The cases are very numerous, and no attempt can
be made here to give more than the broadest treatment.
The states may be usefully classified in three groups: (1)
Some states grant "complete" immunity to charities. Even in
such states, relaxations of the rule have occurred. Recovery has
been permitted for injuries resulting from breach of a statute or
from certain non-charitable activities of the charitable organi-
zation, and recovery has been permitted on the theory that the
charity maintained a nuisance. (2) Some states grant partial
immunity. The leading example is the rule holding a charity
liable for "corporate negligence." Examples of corporate negli-
gence include wrongful conduct of an employee of the charity
which results in injury to a stranger to the charity and negli-
gence of officers of the charity in selecting incompetent em-
ployees, failing properly to instruct employees, or supplying
1. Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 45 (1952).
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BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS
improper equipment to them. New York until recently had
another rule making nice technical distinctions as to when a
charity could be held to respond in damages. Charitable hos-
pitals were held liable for the "administrative" negligence, as
distinct from "medical" or "professional" negligence, of the
doctors or nurses on their staffs. This rule rested on the theory
that doctors and nurses were independent contractors, bound by
the canons of their respective professions, and hence that the
hospital was not negligent even if the professional person were
an employee. This rule has recently been abandoned in New
York.2 Several other states permit actions against charities but
limit recovery to non-charitable assets or to non-trust assets. A
variant of this rule permits recovery on a liability insurance
policy held by the charity. (3) A third group, growing in num-
ber and including many important states, has repudiated the
immunity entirely. The same rules are applied to a charity that
would apply to any organization. In some of these states, appel-
late courts have adopted this rule retroactively, overruling
existing decisions that had granted complete or partial immun-
ity. In Parker v. Port Huron Hospital,3 the Supreme Court of
Michigan overruled its earlier decision, but made the ruling
prospective only, to apply to the case before it and to other cases
which arose after the date of the decision, September 15, 1960.
This is not an oft-used judicial technique.
The Michigan court in the Port Huron case pointed out that
the doctrine of charitable immunity had first been established
in this country in the Massachusetts case of McDonald v. Massa-
chusetts General HospitaZ,4 which had placed reliance on Holli-
day v. St. Leonard's.5 Yet the Holliday case had been repudi-
ated in its own jurisdiction in 1871, in Foreman V. Mayor of
Canterbury,6 five years before the Massachusetts decision. Thus
the leading case on the point is not one of unimpeachable par-
entage. Particularly influential in attacking the doctrine of
charitable immunity has been the opinion of Associate Justice
Rutledge in President & Directors of Georgetown College v.
2. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
3. 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960).
4. 120 Mass. 432 (1876).
5. 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861).
6. L.R. 6 Q.B. 214 (1871).
t1968]
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Hughes.7 This opinion discusses and rejects all arguments jus-
tifying charitable immunity.
It should be noted that the Port Huron decision overruled a
long series of Michigan cases granting the immunity, including
a case decided only 12 years previously.8 The recency of deci-
sions granting immunity is no guarantee that they will survive
later attack.
In 1952 an exhaustive analysis of the rules in the several states
was compiled in American Law Reports, Annotated.9 Classifica-
tion of a particular state under the above 3-category grouping
involves the exercise of some judgment, but a supportable classi-
fication as of 1952 could assign Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina and Wisconsin as states adhering to com-
plete immunity. Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota and
Hawaii were doubtful since no clear rulings existed. Alabama,
Arizona, California, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, Utah and Vermont ap-
peared to grant no immunity. The other states fell into the
second category, with some variant of partial immunity. This
classification seems to resist any explanation based on location
or economic characteristics of the particular states.
In 1952, the Supreme Court of Mississippi overruled previous
decisions granting qualified immunity to charities.' 0 Since that
time, the question has been argued in several jurisdictions. Even
in states which have reaffirmed their views of complete immun-
ity, the court may indicate, as in Massachusetts, that it might
not decide the matter the same way if it were offered as a new
question. In some cases vigorous dissenting opinions have been
filed.
Since 1952 the doctrine of complete or partial immunity has
been overruled and the view of no immunity adopted in the
7. 130 F2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
8. Erwin v. Saint Joseph's Mercy Hosp., 323 Mich. 114, 34 N.W.2d 480
(1948).
9. Annot., 25 A.L.R2d 45 (1952).
10. Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951).
Vol. 20
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following states: Kansas,"' Michigan,12 New Jersey,18 New
York,' 4 Ohio,' and Washington."8
In two recent cases, the constitutionality of a grant of char-
itable immunity has been challenged, in both cases without
success. In Weeks v. CiZdrene's HospitaZ of PkladeZphia,17 the
Pennsylvania judge-made rule that charities were immune from
tort suits was challenged as unconstitutional under the due
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The court upheld the Pennsylvania rulings, finding that
the immunity rule was not arbitrary and that its classification
was reasonable. In Fourier v. Miiam HospitaZ,8 an 1896 Rhode
Island statute granting immunity to charities was challenged as
violative of both the fourteenth amendment and a state consti-
tutional provision to the effect that every person should have a
remedy for every wrong which he suffered. Again, the court
denied the claim of unconstitutionality.
Charitable immunity in the United States may be summarized
by the words of one of the leading writers in the field of tort
law. In 1964 Dean Prosser, of the University of California,
wrote: "The immunity of charities is clearly in ful retreat; and
it may be predicted with some confidence that the end of the
next two decades will see its virtual disappearance from Ameri-
can law."'19 Clearly, the swing is in the direction he indicates. 2
0
Courts attacking the doctrine lay great emphasis on the view
that what is really at stake when a hospital raises the defense
11. Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954).
12. Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960).
13. Dalton v. Saint Luke's Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 23 141 A.2d 273 (1958);
Collopy v. Newark Eye & Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 141 A2d 276 (1958).
The New Jersey decisions were later overruled by statute and immunity re-
stored.
14. Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y2d 656, 143 N.E2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
15. Avellone v. Saint John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E2d 410 (1956).
This case was restricted in application to hospitals in Gibbon v. YWCA, 170
Ohio St 280, 164 N.E.2d 563 (1960).
16. Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260
P2d 765 (1953).
17. 200 F. Supp. 77 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
18. 93 LI. 299, 175 A.2d 298 (1961), affd on rehearing, 93 RI. 299, 179
A.2d 578 (1962).
19. W. PaossER, HANDBOOox THE LAw OF ToRas, § 127, at 1024 (3d ed.
1964).
20. The reason for the departure of the courts from the doctrine of charitable
immunity, even when this requires overruling decisions upon which some re-
liance might have been placed by hospitals within the jurisdiction concerned,
are succinctly set forth in Brown, Stare Decisis Is Worth Its Weight itn Reason:
Abolish the Charitable Immunity Doctrine, 46 A.B.AJ. 629 (1960).
1968]
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of charitable immunity is the cost of insurance premiums guard-
ing against liability. Any hospital would be well advised to
investigate carefully whether it should not carry liability insur-
ance that would cover blood transfusion accidents, regardless of
the law that seems presently to apply in the particular jurisdic-
tion. The same observation would apply to blood banks, since in
many instances primary liability would rest upon them rather
than upon the hospital.
II. THEOnIES oF ABSOTE LvABIa
(LBiY WrrouT FAULT)
A. Introduction
In recent years, various theories have been argued in trans-
fusion cases whereby hospitals and blood banks would be liable
for transfusion injuries even in the absence of negligence. Thus
far, such theories have been rejected by the courts. Adoption of
these theories would greatly extend the potential range of liabil-
ity in transfusion cases.
The usual basis for legal liability in a case involving trans-
mission of hemologous serum hepatitis or transfusion with in-
compatible blood would rest on allegations of negligence. le-
cently, counsel have attempted to predicate liability on theories
which would relieve the claimant of the burden of proving
negligence in the transfusion process. No court of last resort has
yet adopted any of these theories, but strong dissenting opinions
have been filed. The course of decision in this area is deserving
of close attention. It should be noted that if liability were held
to exist irrespective of fault on the part of the hospital or blood
bank, issues would still remain for litigation, particularly the
difficult question of causation. The burden of counsel for the
claimant would be greatly eased, however, if any of these
theories were adopted.
:Relatively few accident cases go through litigation; the vast
majority are settled by bargaining between counsel for the
claimant and the defendant. Procedural considerations and the
likelihood of success if the case were litigated are crucial in
determining the willingness of counsel for the defense to settle
the case on terms favorable to the claimant. If a case involving
serious injury can get to the jury, the result both as to legal
liability and as to amount of damages is highly unpredictable.
It is apparent that juries tend to resolve doubts in favor of
[V l; 20
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liability. The jury might postulate the existence of insurance
coverage or consider the institutional defendant better able to
bear the burden of accident than the individual claimant. Dam-
age awards have increased markedly in recent years, stimulated
by rulings under federal statutes (particularly the Federal Tort
Claims Act and the Federal Employers' Liability Act) awarding
substantial damages and by the efforts of the National Associa-
tion of Claimants' Counsel of America (NACCA) in favor of
the "adequate award" in damage actions.
The best weapons in the arsenal of counsel for the defense are
the rules of law by which the courts will rule in their favor
without permitting the case to go to the jury. Although pro-
cedural rules differ in detail in the several jurisdictions, some
rule exists in every state whereby the court will rule peremp-
torily for the defense if the claimant does not state a cause of
action or if his evidence is not sufficient to permit reasonable
men to arrive at a verdict in his favor.
The influence on these practical rules governing the bargain-
ing power of claimants would be great if the alternate theories
of liability suggested below were to be recognized.
Any rule of substantive law or procedure which enlarges
the jury's theoretical sphere tends to extend liability....
Rules of the latter kind, however, are effective in restricting
liability only when they result in a withdrawal of the whole
case from the jury, and are not particularly effective when
they are reflected only by language in the charge.21
B. Sale of Goods-Warranty
One such theory is that a blood transfusion, when there is a
charge for the blood, is a sale of goods; hence, the warranties of
quality and merchantability extended by the Sales Act, now the
Uniform Commercial Code, apply. The only courts to consider
this question have rejected the argument, sometimes over vigor-
ous dissents. These courts have held the transaction to constitute
a sale of services, rather than a sale of goods. The device of
securing a release from the patient would appear to be of limited
utility.
J1 Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital,22 the highest court of
New York rejected by a four to three vote the theory that a
21. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAmxs, THE LAw oF ToRTs 894 (1956).
22. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E2d 792 (1954).
1968]
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patient who received a transfusion could recover for breach of
warranty when she became infected with homologous serum
hepatitis through blood supplied to her by the hospital at a
stated price. Section 96 of the New York Personal Property
Law created implied warranties of quality and fitness in the
following relevant instances:
1. Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes
known to the seller the particular purpose for which the
goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on
the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or
manufacturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the
goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.
2. Where the goods are bought by description from a
seller who deals in goods of that description (whether he be
the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied
warranty that the goods shall be of merchantable quality.23
The court held that in its totality, the transaction was an indi-
visible contract for medical services to the patient, not a sale of
goods, and hence, that the Sales Act provisions were inappli-
cable. The hospital made a separate charge of $60 for the blood,
which it had purchased from the Blood Transfusion Association,
a third party defendant in the case. Mrs. Perlmutter sought
$50,000 damages. No allegation of negligence on the part of the
hospital was made. The majority justices emphasized that hold-
ing the hospital liable under the Sales Act would mean that how-
ever careful it was, the hospital would be responsible. It was
pointed out, the court citing American Medical Association
research, that informed opinion held that there was no means of
detecting, nor practical means of treating, the blood to eliminate
the jaundice virus. The dissenting justices argued that there
would be no injustice in holding the hospital liable, particularly
since it would have a remedy over against the blood bank. It
would be no startling development were an American court to
hold otherwise on these facts. "One conclusion is evident from
the Perlmutter case; that there is the very real possibility that
other courts, and even the New York court, may yet hold hos-
23. N.Y. PERsoxAL PROPERTY LAW § 96 (McKinney 1962). Commercial
warranties are now controlled by UNo~an COM MCIAL CODE §§ 2-312 to -315,
but the distinction between "sales" and "services" remains.
[Vol. 20
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pitals and blood banks to be insurers of the quality of the blood
they furnish."24
For this reason, the American Medical Association Legal De-
partment has suggested that hospitals should change their billing
practices and not state the charge for blood as a separate charge.
Further, they have suggested that hospitals obtain agreements
for blood transfusions which expressly negate any implied war-
ranty of the blood, particularly as to being free from infectious
hepatitis. Even if such protective devices as these are found by
hospitals and blood banks to be administratively feasible, they
do not guarantee protection from liability. A court which felt
inclined to adopt the theory of warranty for purchased blood
could with equal ease penetrate the device of not separating the
charge therefor. Even express written negations of warranty
have been held ineffective by rulings that the statement had not
been clearly brought to the purchaser's attention,25 or by a
broader criticism that the waiver of warranty was against nat-
ural justice and good morals in the circumstances.26 Neither of
these situations involved the sale of blood, but they illustrate
the danger of reliance entirely on disclaimer of warranty.
It might in any case be inadvisable medically to warn the
patient himself, who is about to receive a transfusion, of the
danger of infectious hepatitis. An affidavit filed in Fischer v.
Wilhmington General Hospital27 argued that the psychological
and psychosomatic effect of such alarm would run counter to
the beneficial effect sought to be produced by the transfusion
itself. Certainly, a seriously ill patient about to undergo a major
operation might be considered by a court to be in a particularly
disadvantageous position to attend to a disclaimer of warranty.
In two other courts the theory of implied warranty has been
put forward and rejected. The Supreme Court of Washington,
in Gile v. Kennewick Public Hospital District," held that a
transfusion was part of the services rendered a patient, and not
a sale of blood. The Supreme Court of Utah agreed in a recent
24. Blood Trarnusions-Medcolegal Responsiblities, 163 J.A.MA. 283, 286
(1957).
25. Landreth v. Wyckoff, 67 App. Div. 145, 73 N.Y.S. 388 (1901). Specific
rules controlling disclaimer of warranties are now set out in Uons Com-
zmmL CoDE § 2-316.
26. Linn v. Radio Center Delicatessen, 169 Misc. 879, 9 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1939).
27. 51 Del. 554, 149 A2d 749 (Super. Ct 1959). See also Umroaa Cou-
3mRCAL CODE § 2-302 (unconscionable contract or clause).
28. 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P2d 662 (1956).
1968]
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decision, Dibblee v. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital.29 The
plaintiff based his argument on the California Cutter Labora-
tories decisions discussed below. The court found these decisions
not persuasive, as well as distinguishable, saying that there was
no kinship between a hospital furnishing blood and a commercial
enterprise selling its products. "No hospital gives green trading
stamps on the occasion of a blood transfusion ... .,"1o said the
court. "We do not say that hospitals should be immune from
negligence. But we think they should not be strapped with an
insurability of blood purity, absent negligence."3 1 Implied war-
ranty was also rejected in Goelz v. J. K. Wadley Research Insti-
tute & Blood Bank,3 2 which rested primarily on charitable
immunity.
A few sentences from the brief of the appellant in the Dibblee
case in Utah show the argument for extending liability under a
theory of warranty:
It is submitted that the cry of alarm raised by defendant
in the case at bar as to the disastrous results to hospitals
which would follow from the imposition of such liability is
more apparent than real. Certainly, no such alarming re-
sults have occurred to our knowledge in the food field and
the restaurant field from the general application of this
doctrine throughout the country. Furthermore, if the hos-
pital is as careful as it claims to be and if incompatible
blood transfusions are as rare as it claims them to be, then
there will be no flood on the courts of this state.... It is no
answer to say that liability for negligence is sufficient, inas-
much as the victim can hardly invade the laboratories of the
hospital and ferret out evidence of negligence from unwill-
ing witnesses who are reluctant to admit of mistakes.38
As this argument indicates, counsel relied primarily on cases
outside the area of blood transfusion litigation. He cited the
recent decision of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,3 4
which involved a new car purchased by the husband of the plain-
29. 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961).
30. Id. at 244, 364 P.2d at 1087.
31. Id. at 243, 364 P2d at 1087.
32. 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1961).
33. Brief for Appellant at 28, Dibblee v. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints
Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 240, 364 P.2d 1085 (1961).
34. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
[Vol. 20
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tiff. After about ten days' driving, the steering wheel and front
wheels suddenly went out of control, causing the car to crash.
The car was so demolished that it was impossible to find out the
cause of the accident. The court allowed the case to go to the
jury on the theory of implied warranty and rejected the tech-
nical defenses of lack of privity of contract and disclaimer of
warranty. Counsel also relied on CusIing v. Rodman,85 a case
involving the sale of food, in which the court thought that it
was unnecessary to decide the narrow question whether there was
an actual technical "sale" of food by a restaurant. The court
said: "Even though the transaction is not a sale, every argument
for implying a warranty in the sale of food is applicable
with even greater force to the serving of food to a guest or
customer at an inn or restaurant. A sale is not the only
transaction in which a warranty may be implied."3 6 These
cases are mentioned here to point out that the developing law
in quite different factual situations might have implications
for blood transfusion liability.
The Cutter Laboratories decisions also bear on this problem.
Several children contracted poliomyelitis in 1955 shortly after
being innoculated with the Salk vaccine manufactured by Cut-
ter. Verdicts were awarded in particular cases brought in the
California courts for $139,000, $15,800, over $51,000, over $30,-
000, over $26,000 and over $12,600. The leading decision is
Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories,37 rendered by an intermedi-
ate appellate court in California in 1960, in which the court
affirmed judgments for two of the children.
38
In one of the Cutter cases, the jury found: "With regard to
the law of warranty, however, we feel that we have no alterna-
tive but to conclude that Cutter Laboratories came to market...
vaccine which when given to plaintiffs caused them to come
down with poliomyelitis, thus resulting in a breach of warranty.
For this cause alone we find in favor of plaintiffs."3 9 The jury
expressly found that Cutter was not negligent either directly or
by inference. In affirming, the district court of appeals said:
35. 82 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
36. Id. at 864, quoting from 1 S. WIULsToN, THE LAw GOVERNING SALES OF
GooDs AT CommoN LAW AND UNDER THE UNIFOR SALES ACT 486 (2d ed.
1924).
37. 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
38. These cases are discussed in Freeman, The 1960 Cutter Decisions: A
Lesson in Judicial Law-Making, 9 DEFNSE L.J. 19 (1964).
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In view of the established California rule that the con-
sumer of a food product may recover from the manufac-
turer upon implied warranty, is there any reason to apply
a different rule to the vaccine here involved?. We think not.
The vaccine is intended for human consumption quite as
much as is food.
The fact that entry is made by injection rather than in-
gestion in no way alters the premise that each is for human
consumption-each enters the human system. In fact, the
digestive system has means of rejecting or minimizing the
effects of many toxic compounds taken orally. Such de-
fenses are much less available as against harmful elements
introduced into the system by hypodermic injection.
40
The court in the Cutter case found the defendant liable de-
spite the fact that the jury made a finding of non-negligence;
liability was rested on breach of warranty under the California
Uniform Sales Act, Section 1731.41 This is basically the same as
the New York provision quoted above in discussion of the Per-
mutter case. The usual defense of a manufacturer sued by the
ultimate consumer of goods is technically referred to as privity
of contract; that is, the manufacturer asserts that he has made
no contract with the user, and hence, has made no warranties to
him. Several courts recognize exceptions to this doctrine regard-
ing goods that might be inherently dangerous in use, and the
exceptions have been generally extended to foodstuffs. The
California court found the initial sale to the distributor-in this
case the doctor-was sufficient to impose responsibility on the
manufacturer for fulfilling implied warranties that ran to the
benefit of persons whom the manufacturer intended to become
ultimate consumers.
The Cutter rulings would appear to be clearly inapplicable to
blood transfusion cases in California since that state has a
statute which declares that the processing of blood is not to be
deemed a "sale" thereof.42 However, the ruling does adopt a
theory at variance with the majority opinion in the Perbmutter
case. In Spencer v. Cutter Laboratories, apparently unreported,
a Tennessee claimant, who had contracted polio from vaccine
supplied by Cutter, sued in the Federal District Court, Northern
40 Id. at 323.
41. CAL. UNIORM SALES AcT § 1735 (West 1954).
42. CAL. HEALTH & SApry CODE § 1623 (West 1964).
[Vol. 20
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District of California. The court held that the case was gov-
erned by Tennessee law and that an action predicated on the
theory of warranty was not maintainable.
These decisions and developing doctrine indicate that this area
of the law needs close and continuing study.
C. Pure Food and Drug Acts
Another such theory urges that the transfusion of blood con-
taining hepatitis constitutes a violation of the Federal or ,State
Pure Food and Drug Act. The only case to arise denied liability
under this theory, but by a two to one vote. The new technique
of storing plasma for six months to eliminate hepatitis virus
must be considered in this context; failure to utilize the tech-
nique might be considered negligence.
The Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act provides:
Adultered drugs and devices: A drug or device shall be
deemed to be adulterated-(a) (1) If it consists in whole or
in part of any filthy, putrid, or decomposed substance .... 4s
The federal act is applicable only to drugs transported in inter-
state commerce. Tennessee has an act patterned after the federal
act and containing similar language.44 These are criminal and
regulatory statutes, but it has been held that violation of the
federal act with resulting injury to an ultimate consumer gives
rise to civil liability.
45
In Merck & Company v. Kidd 46 an action was brought by a
claimant who in connection with an emergency operation had
received a blood plasma transfusion and had apparently con-
tracted homologous serum hepatitis. The original complaint was
in three counts, charging (1) negligence of the defendant in man-
ufacture of the plasma, (2) breach of implied warranty of mer-
chantability, and (3) violation of the Tennessee act. Prior to
trial the first two counts were dropped, so the case was tried
solely on violation of the Tennessee act. The theory of the plain-
tiff's case was that the transfusion of plasma containing jaun-
dice virus was a violation of the Tennessee act and constituted
negligence per se. This rested necessarily on the assertion that
plasma containing hepatitis viris constituted an adulterated drug
43. 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-64 (1964).
44. 42 TENN. CoDE ANN. §§ 101-24 (1956).
45. Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. Eutsler, 276 F2d 455 (4th Cir. 1960).
46. 242 F2d 592 (6th Cir. 1957).
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under the statute, the virus being a "filthy substance." The
action was brought under the federal diversity jurisdiction,
which required the federal court to determine the law of Tennes-
see. Since there were no Tennessee decisions, the court looked to
cases under the federal statute to shed light on what Tennessee
might decide.
The trial court refused the defendant's motions for a directed
verdict and permitted the jury to conclude from the testimony of
medical experts whether the drug was "filthy." The jury ren-
dered a verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal, the decision was
reversed by a two to one vote of the appellate court, which held
that the word "filthy" in the statute did not embrace blood con-
taining hepatitis virus. Here again, as in the Permutter case,
the dissent was vigorous. The court found it unnecessary to con-
sider two of the defendant's arguments: that the plaintiff had
assumed the risk, in that he had consented to whatever medical
treatment was necessary (his wife had signed such consent, and
the plaintiff testified that he had authorized her to do so), and
in that his physician had administred the plasma knowing of
the risk of hepatitis; and second, that if the physician were not
authorized to assume this risk for the plaintiff, then the physi-
cian was negligent in not advising the plaintiff of the risk, and
such negligence was an intervening cause relieving defendant of
liability.
The court seemed to assume that the plasma constituted a
"drug," but the majority held that the hepatitis virus was not a
"filthy substance" within the statutory language. As in the
Perlmutter case, the majority of the court argued that it would
be unfair to make a rule under which liability could not be pre-
vented by a proper manufacturing method. "[A] virus which
cannot be seen even with the most powerful microscope, which
cannot be described, and the presence of which cannot be known
at all except for its ultimate result, is not a filthy substance
within the intendment of the statute." 47 A case holding that
bacillus typhosus absorbed by live oysters during their growth
rendered them filthy within the food sections of the federal act
was distinguished on the ground that such bacillus is detectable
microscopically. 48 The dissenting judge found this distinction
tenuous and urged that serum hepatitis virus in plasma should
47. Id. at 596.
48. United States v. Sprague, 208 F. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1913).
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as a matter of law render the substance filthy. None of the
judges commented on a 1954 paper in the Journal of the Ameri-
can Medical Association relative to the elimination of hepatitis
virus from plasma by storage at room temperature for a six
months period;49 presumably the operative facts in the case
occurred before this practice became established. A failure to
utilize the six months storage safeguard where utilization was
practical would now make a persuasive case for a finding of
negligence. The- Kidd case remains an important decision for
whole blood transfusion cases in which hepatitis develops, even
if the new technique is approved medically in plasma cases.
D. Assault and Battery
Giving a blood transfusion to a person without his consent can
constitute a battery. The question might arise where the wrong
person is given a transfusion. Special care should be exercised
where a child is donor or recipient of blood; the parent might be
the only one capable of giving effective consent. Troublesome
questions arise in connection with transfusions to members of the
Jehovah's -Witnesses sect or their children.
Though not strictly involving liability without fault, the
assault and battery cases may conveniently be discussed at this
point. Any unprivileged, unconsented contact with the person
of another, if intentional, can constitute a battery. Actual harm
is not essential to recovery; a jury can award actual damages to
a person who has suffered from the contact, but it can also
award "general" damages for the invasion of the person. A few
cases have arisen in which damages have been awarded against
doctors or hospitals, where the theory of the case might have
been battery or trespass to the person. In such a case, liability
could not be avoided however strong the proof of care exercised
by the doctor or the hospital. Ordinarily, a donor of blood or a
patient recipient of blood cannot assert that a battery was com-
mitted since he has given his consent to the particular act.
1. Transfusion of 'Wrong Person
In Necolayff v. Genessee Hospital,"0 an intermediate appellate
court granted recovery against the hospital when the wrong
patient was given a blood transfusion, the court finding that this
49. Allen, Enerson, Barron & Sykes, Pooled Plasma with Little or No Risk
of Homologous Serum Jaundice, 154 J.A.M.A. 103 (1954).
50. 270 App. Div. 648, 61 N.Y.S2d 832 (1946).
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constituted at least negligence, if not trespass and assault (bat-
tery). An intern and a nurse came into the patient's room and
advised her that she was to have a blood transfusion, the blood
having been obtained from her "daughter Lillian." The patient
informed them that she had not been told that she was to have a
transfusion and that she had no such daughter. The transfusion
was actually intended for another patient on the same floor.
Since the patient suffered a chill and rising temperature during
the transfusion, the process was stopped and her doctor sum-
moned. Later she became mentally ill and had to spend some
time in a mental hospital. Damages in the amount of $6,500
were awarded. Apparently the blood was incompatible. Most of
the court's opinion is devoted to whether the transfusion was a
professional or administrative act-the question of charitable
immunity. It is obvious that any amount of care in typing and
cross-matching would not avail as a defense in this situation;
recovery might be allowed without any proof of harm to the
patient on the theory that the invasion of her person was unper-
mitted.
2. Infants: Jehovah's Witnesses
The consent of a minor to giving or receiving blood may be
held ineffective to relieve a defendant of liability. Some cases
hold that if an infant is old enough to know the significance of
what he is doing, he can effectively give consent. Only one
blood donor case has arisen, Zaman v. Schultz, 51 in which a
doctor was held liable for taking the blood of a minor without
the consent of his parents. It appears that in Zaman actual
harm was suffered by the child. The Southwest Blood Banks'
technical procedures, whereunder the consent of unmarried
minors between 18 and 21 years of age, other than servicemen,
may be accepted only with the written consent of their parent
or guardian, appears to be a wisely conservative practice.
More distressing are the Jehovah's Witnesses cases, discussed
in the Journal of American Medical Assioation.52 The conclu-
sion therein appears sound: that an adult patient may refuse to
receive a transfusion, however desperate the need in medical
opinion, and his refusal must be honored. It would quite accord
with legal principles if a jury awarded damages for battery to
a patient who refused his consent to a transfusion, even though
51. 19 Pa. D. & C. 309 (1932).
52. See Blood Transfusions-ehovaWs Witnesses, 163 J.A.M.A. 660 (1957).
[Vol. 20
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss1/2
BLOOD TuMXSFUSIONS
the patient's life were saved thereby and the transfusion resulted
in no injury to him. The insult to the person of a member of the
Jehovah's Witnesses sect could support a recovery of "general"
damages, the amount of which lies largely in the discretion of
the jury. It is of course unlikely that a jury would award more
than nominal damages in such a case. Where harm resulted to
the patient from the transfusion, however, a strong case for
recovery would arise, no matter how careful the administration
of the blood. The Journal article points out the wisdom of
obtaining a written and witnessed request from a patient who
insists that he not be administered blood, in order to create a
medical record justifying the failure to utilize transfusion.
Extreme caution is warranted to avoid liability in transfusing
a child of a Jehovah's Witness. Some courts have granted per-
mission to give a transfusion to a child member of the sect,
despite the refusal of consent by the parent, upon a showing that
a failure to do so would jeopardize the life of the child. In
People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz,53 a lower court issued an
order appointing a guardian authorized to give consent to a
transfusion. The child was eight days old and suffered from
erythroblastosis fetalis, and at the time of the successful transfu-
sion, her blood count had been dropping steadily. The Supreme
Court of Illinois found no violation of religious liberties of the
parent in this procedure. 4 In another case two Indiana physi-
cians anticipated the transfusion need during a patient's preg-
nancy, since the patient was Rh negative and her husband Rh
positive, and obtained a court order before delivery authorizing
transfusion if it became necessary. Three days after birth, the
transfusion was performed. 55
E. Criminal and Administrative Sanotions
Indictments recently issued have charged defendants with
intentional violations of federal laws regulating manufacture
and distribution of whole or processed human blood. Hospitals
or blood banks might be criminally prosecuted for unintentional
violation of these regulations. They might also be held civilly
liable for harm to a blood recipient who was transfused with
illegally processed blood, especially if the hospital knew the
53. 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E2d 769 (1952).
54. Accord, Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Kan. City, Mo. Ct. App.
1952).
55. This incident was discussed by Hirsh, Medicolegal Responsibilities of
Blood Transfusion (unpublished address).
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blood was illegally prepared or were negligent in finding this
out. The Federal Trade Commission has charged violation of
the anti-trust laws in the community lood bantking operations
in the Kansas City area.
The principal concern of this memorandum is with the poten-
tial civil liability of hospitals and blood banks for injuries aris-
ing in the transfusion process. Recent developments have called
attention to the fact that other areas of the law are applicable to
the operations of these institutions. In a federal court in New
York, individual and corporate defendants were indicted on
charges such as altering the expiration dates on bottles of blood,
using false donor numbers, and selling blood products without
the required federal license. Other defendants were indicted
later in 1962, in the same court, for selling plasma processed at
an unlicensed laboratory. On July 5, 1962, the Federal Trade
Commission commenced proceedings against individuals and
non-profit charitable organizations in the Kansas City area,
charging restraint of trade and attempted monopoly in the
exchange, sale, and distribution of human blood in interstate
commerce.
These proceedings involved technical legal problems outside
the scope of this memorandum, but it would be useful at this
time to set forth the allegations of the complaints in the respec-
tive proceedings and to indicate possible lines of inquiry foi
future attention.
1. The Criminal Proceedings
In United States v. Calise,56 the defendants were indicted in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York on charges of altering the expiration dates on bottles
of blood, using false donor numbers, and selling blood products
without the required federal license. The blood products were
allegedly moved in interstate commerce or intended for inter-
state shipment. The indictment contained 80 counts. Counts 1
through 58 charged labelling containers of whole human blood
falsely to show an expiration date later than that originally
affixed. Counts 59 through 75 charged causing to be affixed a
56. Pre-trial motions were decided in 217 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
No further disposition of this case is reported, but the defendant Calise was
indicted as co-defendant in another proceeding growing out of the same inci-
dent and was found guilty of conspiring to violate the Public Health Service
Act. United States v. Steinschreiber, 219 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff'd,
326 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1964). This is the next case to be discussed.
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number purporting to identify a specific pint, drawn by the
Community Blood and Plasma Service, defendants well knowing
that it was not the blood assigned such number. Counts 76
through 78 charged knowingly bringing for sale or selling
washed cells from human blood, prepared at an establishment
that did not hold a federal license. Count 79 charged the same
for whole human blood. Count 80 charged that the defendants
conspired with named co-conspirators, not joined as defendants,
to violate the provisions governing the acts alleged above. It
was charged that part of the conspiracy was that the blood be
transferred from one container to another after drawing, that
washed cells would be prepared without proper safeguarding,
that false and misleading labelling would be used in regard to
the identity of the manufacturer and the date of expiration, and
that blood products would be prepared and held under unsani-
tary conditions. Shipments to New York, Puerto Rico, and
Massachusetts were alleged.57
In United States v. Steinschreiber,58 counts 2 through 8
charged knowingly sending or bringing for sale from one state
to other states or foreign countries normal human plasma not
prepared at an establishment holding a license issued as required
by the Public Health Service Act.5 9 Counts 10 through 15
charged falsely labelling and marking packages and containers
to show "U.S. License No. 224" when the products were not man-
ufactured at an establishment holding a license. Counts 13
through 15 charged falsely marking to indicate that plasma had
been irradiated and aged six months before drying. Count 1
charged a conspiracy among the defendants with each other and
with others unknown to the government. Under this allegation
it was charged that pursuant to the conspiracy the defendants
Fisher and Kenworth Laboratories and Cappel and Cappel
Laboratories would manufacture dried human plasma at an
establishment that did not hold a federal license and that the
defendant Steinschreiber would cause the blood products to be
brought from New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania to for-
eign countries and from New Jersey and Pennsylvania to New
York. Overt acts pursuant to the conspiracy were alleged.
57. Applicable provisions of law were 42 U.S.C. §§ 262(a), (b), (f) (1964);
42 C.F.R. § 73.50 (1967) ; 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
58. Pre-trial motions were decided in 218 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
The case was decided in 219 F. Supp. 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), af'd, 326 F.2d 759
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 962 (1964).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (1964).
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Two questions are suggested for future research. First, to
what extent might a blood bank or hospital be found liable for
inadvertent violations of the federal statutes? The instant in-
dictments alleged deliberate and wanton violation of the Federal
provisions. However, criminal conviction of innocent violators
has been upheld under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act. Neither intentional violation of the Act nor negligence
need be shown; the innocent transgressor of the law is as subject
to prosecution as the guilty.60 The provisions of state regula-
tions of blood banking operations would raise similar problems.
Inquiry might usefully be addressed to the question of the
extent to which an innocent recipient of blood products such as
a hospital might run afoul of the federal act or state law. Sec-
ond, a hospital or blood bank which receives and passes on or
uses blood products which have been prepared under conditions
which violate the law might become liable to the ultimate user
if harm results. In the criminal cases discussed herein, some of
the allegedly mislabelled blood products were shipped to hos-
pitals for use in transfusions. It is to be hoped that these ship-
ments have been traced and destroyed, or at least subjected to
further testing to determine that they may be used safely. If a
hospital knowingly or negligently uses defective blood products,
liability could result.
2. The Federal Trade Commission Proceeding
The proceeding entitled In re Oomanunity Blood Bank"' was
commenced by a complaint of the Federal Trade Commission
on July 5, 1962. The gist of the complaint was that the respond-
ents, the Community Blood Bank, the Kansas City Area Hos-
pital Association, the member hospitals of the latter (three of
which were named respondents and the others of which were
asserted to be represented by the three in a class action proceed-
ing), and fifty individuals, including the governing boards of
the respondent organizations, their executive directors and six-
teen pathologists, conspired and acted to boycott two commercial
blood banks and to establish their own nonprofit community
bank. All of the respondent blood banks, as well as the allegedly
excluded blood banks, were licensed by the government. The two
affiliated commercial blood banks, Midwest and World Blood
60. See Developments in, the Lau-Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act,
67 HARV. L. REv. 632, 694-96 (1954).
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Bank, were allegedly excluded from supplying blood to the
member hospitals, prevented from becoming members of
A.A.B.B., and prevented from participating in blood exchange
and replacement programs organized by the respondents.
Many technical questions arose in this proceeding. Looking
beyond the proceeding itself, there are possibilities of private
damage actions brought by the excluded blood banks. Questions
such as the applicability of the treble damages provisions of the
anti-trust laws and the extent to which the excluded banks could
use the findings of the Federal Trade Commission as proof of
violation of the Act in a private action for damages could use-
fully be researched. The broader question suggested by the in-
stant proceedings is the extent to which the federal anti-trust
laws could apply to existing or contemplated organizational
structures for the control and dissemination of blood products.
III. CLt.ms BASin ON NEGLIGENCE
A. Introduction
Negligence is the failure to observe due care in all the circum-
stances. For professional specialists, the standard of due care
is the degree of skill to be expected from the general class of
persons pursuing that calling. Courts of law will usually rely
on the testimony of experts in that field, presented by the parties
to the dispute, to inform the trier of fact as to the current state
of scientific knowledge in the field.
Negligence may be defined as conduct "which falls below the
standard established by law for the protection of others against
unreasonable risk of harm." 2 The usual statement of the stand-
ard is the conduct which the reasonably prudent man would
employ under the circumstances. Where professional conduct is
concerned, the actor is held to the degree of skill which the gen-
eral class of persons pursuing that professional calling would
possess. If the conduct under inquiry is beyond the experience
of the average juror, expert witnesses are permitted to give their
opinions, based on the expert's observation of the conduct in
question, if he observed it, or based on a hypothetical question
drawn from the evidence in the case, if he did not. Most juris-
dictions also permit the expert to testify as to the customary
methods in the profession, particularly the custom in that area.
Evidence that a defendant hospital followed the customary
62. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 282 (1965).
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methods and procedures in typing and cross-matching blood
would at least be probative, and in some cases might be con-
clusive, to show the exercise of due care. Evidence that a hos-
pital exercised less than the customary precautions would sup-
port an argument for negligence; at the least, it would indicate
that the precautions omitted were feasible and not undly
burdensome. The testimony of experts can be supplemented by
the court's taking judicial notice-that is, instructing the jury
concerning matters of scientific knowledge that are indisputable
and are available in easily accessible sources. In blood transfu-
sion cases, the state of the medical record in the case, as supplied
by expert testimony and by propositions judicially noticed, can
be expected to be crucial.
In a well-prepared case counsel for the claimant will utilize
expert medical advice in the preparation of his case. He will
also study the medical literature and will present, either through
expert witnesses or through the judicial notice technique, argu-
ments from medical literature as to what constitutes due care in
the profession. The cases illustrate that the scientific and medi-
cal testimony is particularly important in the first transfusion
case brought in the jurisdiction, when the court is concerned with
establishing the basic rules of law that will govern future cases.
B. Proof of Negligence; Res Ipsa Loquitur
Res ipsa loquitur is a procedural device which aids a claimant
in getting his case to the jury without the necessity for proving
the specific acts of negligence. No ease has yet held that mere
occurrence of a hemolytic reaction, by itself, gives rise to an
inference of negligence. We may expect that transfusion of the
wrong type blood to a patient will be held to constitute negli-
gence, or give rise to an inference of negligence.
In any negligence action the plaintiff will normally carry two
burdens, technically called the burden of producing evidence and
the burden of persuasion. The first is by far the more impor-
tant: the plaintiff must introduce enough evidence to permit
a reasonable trier of fact to find that the defendant was negli-
gent. If in a jury trial the plaintiff introduces insufficient
evidence to carry this burden, the court will rule against him,
thus keeping the case from the jury. In other words, whether
the burden of producing evidence has been met is decided by the
judge. The second burden arises only if the first has been met
and the case has been submitted to the trier of fact, usually the
[Vol. 20
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jury. The judge will instruct the jury that the plaintiff has the
burden of persuasion, or burden of proof, on the issue of the
defendant's negligence. Stated otherwise, the jury must find it
more probable than not that the defendant was negligent in
order to find for the plaintiff.
The technical doctrine known as res ipsa loquitur, if found
applicable, will aid the plaintiff in carrying the first burden.
Some jurisdictions hold also that the doctrine aids the plaintiff
with the second burden. The doctrine applies, as usually stated,
where (1) the accident would not ordinarily have occurred in the
absence of negligence; (2) the instrumentality causing the acci-
dent was in the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) the acci-
dent happened without any voluntary action on the part of the
plaintiff; and in some jurisdictions, (4) knowledge of the causes
of the accident was more accessible to the defendant than to the
plaintiff. The important question for our purposes is whether
a plaintiff can get his case to the jury merely by proving that
he or his decedent received a blood transfusion and that a hemo-
lytic reaction occurred resulting in injury or death. On this
point the few cases to date are inconclusive.
Three cases, all in recent years, have raised the question of the
applicability of the doctrine to claims arising from blood trans-
fusions. In Sherman v. Jlartman,63 the plaintiff underwent a
hysterectomy, and while still under anaesthesia, was given a post-
operative transfusion. Her doctor left a nurse on the hospital
staff in charge of the continuing transfusion. While the nurse
was attending the patient, the needle came out of the patient's
vein, and the nurse reinserted it. The nurse then left the patient
with an orderly. The needle came out again, causing 200 c.c. of
blood to go into the soft part of the patient's arm, discoloring
and swelling it. The trial court granted a non-suit as to the hos-
pital, and the jury rendered a verdict for the doctor. On appeal,
the court affirmed the judgment as to the doctor, holding that
he had no duty to remain in attendance during the transfusion
and that the patient was in the care of a registered nurse whom
the doctor could assume had the requisite training and knowl-
edge. As to the hospital, the court reversed the order of non-
suit, applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The accident
was one which would not in common experience have occurred
absent negligence, the hospital had exclusive control of the
63. 290 P.2d 894 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
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process in the persons of the orderly and the nurse, and the
plaintiff did not contribute by voluntary act to the process since
she was under anaesthesia. On this reasoning, the court held the
evidence was sufficient to take the case to the jury. It will be
noted that no question of incompatibility of the blood was
involved in this case.
In Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital, 4 the
plaintiff's wife underwent a tumor removal operation and died
ten days later of inflammation of the kidney. The husband sued,
alleging death was caused by the transfusion of incompatible
blood negligently administered by the hospital. The plaintiff
alleged negligence in the hospital's typing and matching the
blood, administering the transfusion, and failing to stop the
transfusion after an unfavorable reaction was or should have
been noticed. The ju y brought in a verdict for the defendant
hospital. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court
should have instructed the jury that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur applied. The Supreme Court of Utah held that the
trial court was correct in ruling that the plaintiff had not laid
a foundation for invoking the doctrine. Mere occurrence of a
hemolytic reaction in the patient, by itself, was not enough in
the opinion of the court to justify a finding of negligence, since
the evidence indicated that there was no certainty that there
would be no adverse reaction even when the best methods known
to medical science were employed in typing and cross-matching.
Since the hemolytic reaction could have occurred without negli-
gence, the first requisite for application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur was not established.
This case cannot be considered as strong authority that res
ipsa loquitur is not applicable when transfusion results in a
hemolytic reaction. First, the primary test of applicability of
the rule is whether the accident would not ordinarily have
occurred barring negligence, not whether a possible explanation
could be predicated on non-negligence. There is highly respected
opinion in the medical literature even suggesting that hemolytic
reaction is invariably the result of negligence.6 5 Moreover, in
Joseph the plaintiff did not rely on res ipsa in the trial court
but got his case to the jury anyway on evidence of actual negli-
gence. Thus the usual operative effect of res ipsa loquitur was
64. 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P2d 935 (1960).
65. Wiener, Grant, Unger & Workman, Medicolegal Aspects of Blood Trans-
fusions, 151 J.A.M.A. 1435 (1953).
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achieved. The defendant introduced evidence that the blood of
the patient was typed and cross-matched with the donor's blood
and that one of the tests used was the Coombs' Indirect Test.
No suggestion was offered by the plaintiff's counsel that any
other test or precautions could have been employed.
Equally inconclusive is Gillen v. United States,60 a case
brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act.6 7 The plaintiff's
wife was delivered of a still-born child at a military hospital
and suffered post partum hemorrhaging with attending shock.
A blood transfusion was ordered, but she failed to rally and
shortly thereafter died of a lower nephron nephrosis. The plain-
tiff alleged that death was caused by the transfusion of incom-
patible blood due to the failure of the hospital personnel to
determine correctly the wife's blood type. The case was tried
before a judge without a jury, who found for the defendant. On
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, that court held that the evidence,
direct and circumstantial, with whatever dignity the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur added to it, was insufficient to establish the
negligence of the hospital. The court assumed that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur applied but found that under any view as to
its operative effect procedurally, it could not change the result
of the trial court's decision. The Joseph and Gi/len cases are
further discussed below under the heading of provable negli-
gence.
In summary, res ipsa loquitur is a procedural device mainly
useful in getting a claimant's case to the jury when he has intro-
duced little or no evidence showing negligence on the part of the
defendant. Some courts reach the same result without using the
res ipsa label. Such a court might hold that transfusing a
patient whose blood type is 0 with type B blood was circum-
stantial evidence of negligence. We may expect increasing appli-
cation of res ipsa loquitur to blood transfusion cases, particu-
larly to cases involving hemolytic reaction.
0. Provable Negligence-Transfusions With Incompatible Blood
Most actions for injury or death resulting from blood trans-
fusions are brought on a theory of negligence. The problem of
causation is often crucial in such cases. Determination of causa-
tion is aided by appropriate tests conducted after the transfusion
has been discontinued, following an apparent transfusion reac-
66. 281 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1960).
67. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1964).
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tion. No comprehensive listing of the ways in which negligence
can occur in transfusions can be made, but the cases provide
illustrations.
1. Introductory Comments
The majority of the cases involving negligence in blood trans-
fusions concern the transfusion of alleged incompatible blood.
Several of these cases have been handed down in recent years.
It is interesting to note that many of these cases have been won
by the defense, either by ruling of the court or by jury verdict.
For several reasons these cases are discussed in considerable
detail herein. First, negligence cases in particular turn on the
specific facts involved, and detailed presentation of the facts
aids an understanding of exactly what was decided in the case.
Second, these cases are repositories of medical experience in the
transfusion process and hold lessons for the formulation of
greater safeguards to prevent the recurrence of the particular
error. Third, the result of litigation might well turn on the
competency of counsel's presentation of the medical evidence;
hence a consideration herein of how counsel handled the cases
is useful.
2. Post-Transfusion Investigation; Proof of Causation
The most recent incompatibility case is Dibblee v. W. H.
Groves Latter-Day Saints Hospital.68  This case is discussed
above under the heading Absolute Liability. The plaintiff
brought his action on three theories: first, the provable negli-
gence of the defendant; second, res ipsa loquitur; and third,
liability without fault, based on a warranty for sale of goods.
The patient had died, allegedly of transfusions of incompatible
blood. Before the transfusions were given, two registered tech-
nologists had made duplicate and independent tests and had
found that the blood taken from the patient and that of the
donors was identical and compatible. After the transfusions, the
hospital confirmed these tests by two duplicate and identical
tests by registered technologists and further substantiated this
result by a test by a New Jersey Ortho Research Laboratory.
Counsel for the plaintiff, upon acquiring this information
through discovery procedure, abandoned his claims based on
negligence and proceeded to trial only on the theory of breach
of an implied warranty of fitness of "goods sold." The case
68. 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P2d 1085 (1961).
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illustrates the value of sound post-death procedures to investi-
gate the pathological facts.
Post-transfusion tests proved incompatibility of the transfused
blood in Redding v. United States.69 This suit was brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act.70 The case was tried with-
out a jury and resulted in an award of damages of $40,000 to
the injured patient and $10,000 to her husband. The plaintiff,
whose husband was an Army sergeant, was admitted to Fort
Sill Hospital for a vaginal hysterectomy, scheduled for Novem-
ber 4, 1959. In June, 1959, she had been delivered of her seventh
child, and at that time her blood was typed as Group 0, Rh
positive. An enlisted technician whose background consisted of
a junior college chemistry course and eleven months in an on-
the-job training program at the hospital erroneously typed her
blood as Group B, Rh positive, and cross-matched her blood with
that in three bottles from the blood bank refrigerator, each
labelled B, Rh positive. He concluded that the blood was com-
patible. The patient was transfused with 1,000 cc. of this blood,
and a hemolytic transfusion reaction set in. Another laboratory
technician, with a college degree in chemistry and training at the
Army technicians' school, re-typed the patient's blood and deter-
mined it to be Group 0, Rh positive. The chief of the laboratory
section verified this finding, and the patient was then transfused
with 0, Rh positive blood, which saved her life. She did suffer
severe and permanent injury, however. Colonel Crosby, consult-
ant in hematology to the Surgeon General of the Army, investi-
gated the case and filed a memorandum opinion with the Army.
He also testified in the lawsuit. In both instances he argued
that although a mistake had been made, the approved procedures,
even if followed, were not believed sufficient to protect in all
instances against incompatability. In other words, Colonel
Crosby's argument was that some hemolytic tranfusion reactions
are bound to occur even if the typing and cross-matching are
done pursuant to the highest standards.
The trial court rejected this argument, citing the Army tech-
nical manual, T.M. 8-277, Section 91, "Cross-matching." This
manual stated flatly, "This test will reveal any mistakes in blood
grouping .... "171 The court said it was "definitely convinced"
69. 196 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Ark. 1961).
70. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1964).
71. 196 F. Supp. at 877.
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that the employees of the United States had been negligent,
saying:
Of course, the plaintiffs were unable to prove the specific
act or omission of negligence on the part of the defendant's
employees, but the facts and circumstances disclosed by the
testimony are convincing that the employees of the defend-
ant did know, or should have known by the exercise of ordi-
nary care, skill and ability, that the blood in bottles 241 and
281 was incompatible with the patient's blood.72
No appeal was taken by the government from the decision of
the trial judge.
Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosptal,7 3 like the
Dibblee case, involved an alleged transfusion of incompatible
blood resulting in the death of the patient. In the first trial of
the Joseph case, the doctor who had performed the operation on
the patient testified that the patient had died as a result of a
transfusion reaction, and the supreme court on appeal7 4 charac-
terized the testimony of the lab technician, who refused at trial
to concede that any definitive proof existed that the transfusion
reaction caused the death, as "evasive." Statements in the hos-
pital records by two doctors called in as consultants, one stating
that the patient was going into "renal decompensation . . .pos-
sibly on the basis of a transfusion reaction," and the other stating
that the condition of the patient "is undoubtedly a lower
nephron syndrome from hemolytic blood transfusion.. ." were
not permitted in evidence by the trial court. The jury found for
the defendant hospital, and the Supreme Court of Utah re-
versed, directing a new trial. Refusal to admit these records into
evidence was held to be prejudicial error.
On the retrial, the hospital records were admitted into evi-
dence. The jury again returned a verdict for the hospital, the
trial court entered judgment thereon, and the Supreme Court of
Utah affirmed. It appears to have been virtually conceded by
the defense on the second trial that death resulted from a trans-
fusion reaction. The plaintiff asked that the case be sent to the
jury on two theories: first, that the hospital was negligent in
administering incompatible blood and second, that the hospital
72. Id.
73. 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935 (1960).
74. 7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P.2d 330 (1957).
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was negligent in not stopping the transfusion after an unfavor-
able reaction was noticed. The trial court refused to submit the
issue to the jury on the first issue (since no negligence had been
shown), and refused to charge the jury that res ipsa loquitur
could apply. Application of res ipsa loquitur would of course
have relieved plaintiff from the burden of showing negligence.
The jury found against the plaintiff on the only issue that was
submitted to them, the issue of failure to terminate the trans-
fusion. The plaintiff appealed only from the court's ruling on
the first issue, not from the jury's finding on the second. Thus
the narrow issue before the Supreme Court of Utah was whether
res ipsa loquitur could apply to take the case to the jury.
Here the defense counsel successfully utilized through expert
medical witnesses the theory that Colonel Crosby later unsuc-
cessfully advanced in the Redding case. This is not to suggest
that the decisions are inconsistent, for as indicated, the proof of
actual faulty testing of the blood was present in Redding and
absent in Joseph.
Almost all the medical witnesses in the second Joseph case
expressed the view that transfusion reaction due to incompatible
blood was the probable cause of death, although some pointed
out that there could be many other causes of lower nephron
nephrosis. However, their testimony showed that hemolytic
transfusion reaction could occur in unusual cases even though the
cross-matching indicated compatibility. An expert in hematol-
ogy testified that there were 3 to 5 reactions in every 1,000 trans-
fusions, often not caused by negligence, 40 percent of which were
fatal. Other expert testimony stated that transfusion reactions
occurred without negligence in one-tenth to five-tenths of 1
percent of the cases. Counsel for the defendant hospital argued
in his brief:
Based upon these facts we submit it would be grossly
unjust to subject a hospital or a doctor or a technician to
liability and inference of negligence for something which
may not be preventable. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
was not invented for the purpose of imposing liability upon
the innocent merely because a plaintiff is unable to produce
any evidence to prove his case.75
The Supreme Court of Utah in affirming the judgment stated
that blood had been taken from a healthy donor for the trans-
75. Brief for Appellee at 11, Joseph v. W.H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp.,
10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935 (1960).
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fusion, sterile equipment had been used, the donor's blood and
the recipient's were typed and cross-matched in accordance with
generally recognized standards, including the Coombs' test, and
both samples of blood were found to be A, Rh positive. The
defense won this case by making a careful showing of the cus-
tomary procedures used by the hospital, by the fact that nothing
appeared in the blood testing that would put the hospital on
notice that the blood might be incompatible, and by its presen-
tation of the indicated medical and other expert testimony.
These cases are illustrative of the difficult causation problems
posed both for the claimant and the defense in blood transfusion
cases. The most intricate causation case to date is GiZ9en v.
United ,States.7" The opinion of the court disposed of these
questions of causation without discussion, but study of the tran-
script of record discloses bewildering diversity both as to what
actually occurred and as to appropriate medical conclusions to
be drawn therefrom. The action was brought under the Federal
Tort Claims Act 77 for the wrongful death of a serviceman's wife
while she was a patient at Brooke Army Hospital, Fort Sam
Houston. The patient had been admitted to the Air Force Hos-
pital at Perrin Air Force Base on December 19, 1955. On De-
cember 24 at 4:16 p.m. she was delivered of a stillborn child and
suffered post partum hemorrhaging. At 4:30 p.m. transfusion of
500 cc. of blood was ordered and begun, and 350 cc. had been
transfused when, 75 minutes after transfusion had begun, what
appeared to be a hemolytic reaction occurred, manifested by
chills and fever. The transfusion was stopped, a blood specimen
taken, and the specimen together with the transfusion donor
blood was sent to the lab. Neither was then retyped. The patient
was then given some 3,850 cc. of Rh negative type blood. On
December 26 she was transferred to Brooke in an attempt to save
her life, but she died there on January 6, 1956.
At the trial, the testimony and argument were primarily di-
rected to two questions. First, what was the blood type of Mrs.
Gillen? Second, did she have a transfusion reaction? On both
issues, the medical evidence and the expert medical opinion
based thereon were in conflict. As to the first issue, it appeared
that the patient had been delivered of a child earlier in the same
year on February 25, also at Perrin. She had received at that
76. 281 F.2d 425 (9th Cir. 1961).
77. 28 U.S.C. §§ 134(b), 2671-80 (1964).
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time a transfusion of 500 cc. of Rh positive blood. The hema-
tology records indicated that she was Rh positive. However, in
the medical records were undocumented statements to the effect
that she had an Rh negative history. Thus the medical records
were in conflict. Colonel Crosby testified for the defense, and on
cross-examination he was asked about this discrepancy, to which
he responded: "This was hearsay, the source of which nobody
bothered to document. And I, on the basis of that, concluded
that the chances were a million to one that the laboratory docu-
ments were correct and that the hearsay was wrong."
A doctor's progress report of the case stated as of the time fol-
lowing the apparent reaction, "Retype revealed her to be type
O Rh negative and she was given some 3,500 cc. of blood and
4,200 cc. of other fluids." Colonel Crosby disregarded this in
reaching his opinion, believing that this was an error and that
no intervening retyping occurred. As discussed below, it appears
that there was an intervening retyping, however. Colonel Crosby
also emphasized that a lab report had the following written
across its face: "This woman has in the past been typed Rh
negative." This test was reported out as Rh positive in the face
of that statement. The Colonel felt that the lab would have
exercised exceptional care in typing with this warning before it.
The expert witness for the plaintiff, Dr. Carr of the Univer-
sity of California, testified to his belief from the medical records
that she was Rh negative, had been sensitized, and that it was a
classic case of transfusion reaction. Further confusion on the
issue of her blood type was introduced by the testimony of Ser-
geant Villa, a blood technician at Perrin. Mrs. Gillen suffered
the apparent reaction, and the Rlh positive transfusion was
stopped. She then was given Rh negative blood. Sergeant Villa
went to her room while she was receiving this blood and took
more blood from her for retyping. He drew the sample by with-
drawing a portion of rubber tube going into the needle already
in her arm, which was giving her the blood, and by inserting
therein a 10 cc. syringe to withdraw the blood. Then the nurse
continued the transfusion, re-connecting the tube to the needle.
At this time the patient had already received at least an esti-
mated one-half of her blood volume in transfused blood. Ser-
geant Villa then typed the sample and found it to be Rh
negative.
From a medicolegal view, this procedure would seem to be
doubly bad. First, taking blood from a patient, using the same
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needle with which she was being currently transfused, raises to
a layman the possibility that the recently transfused blood would
be obtained, rather than her own. Sergeant Villa believed this
was unlikely because of the fast rate of flow of blood through
the system; but Dr. Cox of Letterman Army Hospital, testify-
ing for the defense, said it was possible, based on his own ex-
perinentation. Second, taking blood for testing from a patient
who has already received in successive transfusions more than
her normal supply of blood raised the question whether she had
had a transfusion exchange so that all or most of the sample was
donor blood anyway. If her original blood had been "essentially
completely replaced," as Dr. Cox believed, by donor blood, noth-
ing useful as to her own blood type could be derived from testing
the sample. On this conflicting state of the proofs, the trial
judge found that she was an 0, Rh positive blood type.
The second issue, regarding the occurrence of a hemolytic
reaction, was equally vigorously contested. The patient's death
certificate, medical and clinical reports at the hospital, and the
autopsy report all stated that she died from nephrosis caused by
incompatible blood transfusions. On this issue, Colonel Crosby
concluded that she had not. Although the data available to the
persons making the above judgments was consistent with trans-
fusion reaction, other data in Colonel Crosby's judgment dic-
tated against this finding. First, every time the blood was typed,
or cross-matched, it was found compatible. Second, no massive
hemolysis was shown. Here, the witness relied on icteric indexes
and Van der Bergh tests performed during the period following
the apparent reaction. At 9:00 p.m., three and one-quarter hours
after the reaction, an icteric index test was performed. Another
was made at 10:30 p.m. The doctor testified that had there been
a reaction, no icteric test could be made. The reading at 10:30
p.m. was 45; on a third test the next morning at 7:30, it was 44.3.
Van der Bergh readings showed "Direct, 4.3, Indirect 2.1;" if
a serious reaction had occurred, he said, the readings would be
between 5 and 10. Third, Colonel Crosby held that the occur-
rence of a transfusion reaction usually manifests itself in in-
stability of the vasomotor system with a fall in blood pressure.
Here, blood pressure was normal over the entire period.
The alternative explanation given for the lower nephron
nephrosis by Dr. Cox was that she had retained placental tissue
and that the doctor's manual attempts to deal with that condi-
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tion brought on the shock. Here again, the trial judge found the
facts in accordance with the theories of the defense.
It is manifest that the result turned on the decision of the
finder of fact-in this case the trial judge. As to the facts, if
the judge had decided the case the other way, the record would
equally support his finding. The likelihood is that a jury would
have decided this case in the plaintiff's favor. The Federal Tort
Claims Act"8 is one of the actions against the United States that
"shall be tried by the court without a jury ... .."79 Thus the
plaintiff in Gillen was not entitled to a jury trial. The plain-
tiff's lawyers have speculated that a right to jury trial might
arise if the individual tort-feasor could be joined as a defendant
with the government, but this view appears doubtful.8 0 At any
rate, the latter case affords no comfort to the non-governmental
hospital or blood bank, which must anticipate that claimants
will ordinarily demand trial by jury.
3. Miseelaneous Acts of Negligence in Transfusions
No catalogue can be compiled to indicate all the ways in which
liability for negligence may arise; life is always more imagina-
tive than the most free-ranging mind. The cases which have
arisen give some indication of the errors of the past and empha-
size the need for rigorous care and scrupulous adherence to
sound standards of procedure.
In Weiss v. Rubin,8 the plaintiff sued an anesthetist, a sur-
geon, and a hospital for the wrongful death and pain and suf-
fering of a surgery patient to whom was administered blood
intended for another. (The anesthetist sued was principal for
another anesthetist who actually assisted at the operation.) A
jury verdict was rendered against all three defendants jointly
for $130,000. This was reduced to $90,000 by remittitur of the
appellate court, and as so reduced, was affirmed by the appellate
division and then by the Court of Appeals of New York. Much of
the discussion in the appellate reports concerns the liability of the
doctor only; one judge in the appellate division and two on the
court of appeals thought that the doctor should not be held
liable.
78. Id.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1964).
80. See, e.g., Englehardt v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1947).
81. 11 App. Div. 2d 818, 205 N.Y.S2d 274 (1960), aFd, 9 N.Y.2d 230, 173
N.E.2d 791, 213 N.Y.S.2d 65.(1961).
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The facts are substantially set forth in Judge Ughetta's dis-
senting opinion in the appellate division:
During the course of a delicate and complicated procedure
upon decedent, the surgeon, defendant Pulrang, was told by
the anesthetist that the latter had the patient's blood ready.
The anesthetist asked 'Shall I give it.' The surgeon re-
sponded in the affirmative. The circulating nurse had come
into the operating room with a bottle of blood on which
there was a slip inscribed with the name of the patient, type
of blood and the name of doctor. The slip showed that the
blood was for another patient, previously operated on, not
by defendant Pulrang, at which operation, however, the
circulating nurse and anesthetist also had been present.
This information on the slip was entirely different from
the facts with respect to decedent. Yet the registered nurse
turned the bottle over to the anesthetist, implying that the
blood was intended for decedent. The anesthetist had a
chart showing the type of blood of decedent. He testified
that it was his duty to check the blood and that a surgeon
does not check blood. He, the anesthetist, did not perform
that duty.
Neither the anesthetist nor the circulating nurse was ster-
ile. There is a shield between the anesthetist and the sur-
geon. To double-check the bottle the surgeon would have
been required, not merely to divert his concentration from
the serious task at hand, but actually to abandon the patient
by leaving the sterile field. As the anesthetist testified, the
surgeon does not check blood; that is the function of the
anesthetist. There is no proof of malpractice on the part of
the surgeon. He had the right to rely on the competency of
the anesthetist and the hospital staff.
8 2
The court of appeals found that on the record the question of
the negligence of the defendant surgeon was properly submitted
to the jury. The proof showed that it was his duty to initiate the
blood bank order, that he knew he had not ordered blood, and
that although it did occur to him to ask how the blood got into
the operating room, he did not do so. The dissenting judges felt
that since it was the duty and sole responsibility of the hospital
to prepare and administer blood transfusions, the doctor was not
82. 11 App. Div. 2d at 819, 205 N.Y.S2d at 276 (dissenting opinion).
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negligent. "If Doctor Pulrang had given a written order for a
transfusion in this instance, transfusion would have been admin-
istered exactly as it was without further participation by Doctor
Pulrang. s83 The hospital's anticipating the need without his
written order did not, in the opinion of these judges, change his
responsibility.
Berg v. New York &ociety for the Relief of the Ruptured &6
Crippled"4 involved a technician's error in reporting the patient's
blood as A, Rh positive when it was actually A, Rh negative. The
patient received 500 cc. of Rh positive blood on March 19, 19417,
and another 100 cc. on March 26, at which time a reaction was
visible and the transfusion was stopped. She was discharged,
became pregnant, was tested again and found to be Rh negative.
The fetus was indicated to be Rh positive, since her titer index
arose substantially during pregnancy. The fetus died on Decem-
ber 2, 194'7, but delivery was delayed until December 31. The
trial court found that the technician concededly made an error
in designating the patient's blood factor and that she was in-
fused with blood of the wrong factor. A judgment for the plain-
tiff of $17,500 and for her husband of $2500 was affirmed by
the court of appeals. Most of the discussion in the opinions in
the various stages of litigation concerns the applicability of the
then New York charitable immunity doctrine.8 5
In Parker v. Port Huron Hospital,6 the plaintiff's wife was
admitted to the hospital for a hysterectomy. The evening of her
admission, a Mrs. Weber, a lab technician, made pre-operative
preparations and blood tests. She was the only lab technician on
duty and was tired and overworked that evening. In drawing a
blood sample she didn't mark the patient's name or identifica-
tion on the tube while at her bedside; she simply dropped a slip
of paper around the tube. This procedure was contrary to the
universal standard practice required in this and other hospitals.
On the same trip, she obtained samples of blood of two other
patients. She returned to the lab with the three samples and
commenced typing. At this point she was interrupted to do an
83. 9 N.Y2d at 234, 173 N.E.2d at 792, 213 N.Y.S.2d at 67 (dissenting
opinion).
84. 1 N.Y.2d 499, 136 N.E.2d 523, 154 N.Y.S2d 455 (1956).
85. In Necolayff v. Genessee Hosp., 270 App. Div. 648, 61 N.Y.S.2d 832
(1946), the patient was mistakenly given a transfusion intended for another
patient, but no incompatibility reaction was mentioned by the court. This case
is discussed in the text under Assault and Battery.
86. 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960).
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immediate blood type for a fourth patient. On her return to her
work on the first three, she confused the sample tubes and the
identification slips, designating Mrs. Parker's blood as A, Rh
positive rather than the correct 0, Rh positive. During the oper-
ation Mrs. Parker was administered one unit and left the table in
apparently good condition, but that afternoon she had a reac-
tion; 13 days later she died. The cause of death was reported as
"acute nephrosis (lower nephron syndrome) incompatible blood
transfusion." She had been taken to surgery at 3:00 pan. on the
day of the transfusion, and the error was then found. In per-
mitting recovery in this case, the Supreme Court of Afichigan
overruled its doctrine of charitable immunity.
In Goelz v. J. K. c& Susie WadZey Researo Institute & BZood
Bank,,817 the blood bank successfully pleaded the defense of
charitable immunity. The plaintiff argued that the transfusion
was a "sale" of blood and that charitable immunity should not
apply thereto. The court, however, decided that the transfusion
was a "service" to which charitable immunity did apply, leaving
open the question of whether a "sale" of blood is outside the
application of charitable immunity. Thus the court did not have
to consider the plaintiff's allegations of negligence. The testi-
mony of the plaintiff tended to prove the following had
occurred. The personal physician of the decedent left an order
for the blood bank to type and cross-match her blood and have
500 cc. available for surgery the following morning. An em-
ployee of the blood bank took the sample, labelled it, and car-
ried it to the blood bank center. Unfortunately, a technician
whose duty it was to type and cross-match her blood filled in
type "AiB" on her card. That type blood was sent to the hos-
pital and used in her transfusion. A reaction resulted during
transfusion. Her doctor discovered the reaction and called in
the director of the blood bank, who ordered an investigation.
It was revealed that the original sample of her blood was still
in the refrigerator, unopened. The practice of the blood bank
was never to replace the cork after the sample had been used, so
the evidence indicated that no tests had ever been performed.
The original sample and her blood were shown to be type 0.
The plaintiff, decedent's husband, sued for damages of $451,000,
alleging that the technician was negligent in the typing, that the
technician was an incompetent employee, and that the blood bank
87. 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1961).
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was negligent in hiring him. It appeared that another sample
of blood with type A1B was in the refrigerator, and the tech-
nician had simply taken the wrong tube for testing.
It is noteworthy that all the cases discussed were handed
down since 1956. Only two earlier cases involving alleged hemo-
lytic transfusion reactions appear to be reported. In NationaZ
Homeopathic Hospital V. Phillips,8 8 the fact that incompatible
blood was erroneously tested and reported as compatible by a
hospital technician appears to be assumed as true. The court
discussed only whether the hospital was the employer and hence
liable for the acts of the technician. In Mississippi Baptist Hos-
pital v. Holmes,89 the technician correctly typed the blood of
Mrs. Holmes and that of Mrs. Holder, two patients on the same
floor, but inadvertently switched the labels. Seven hundred cc.
of type 2 blood (Mrs. Holder's type) was given to Mrs. Holmes
(type 4), and the latter had a hemolytic reaction. Mrs. Holmes'
blood was then re-typed and the error discovered. She was given
another transfusion, but to no avail. In this case, the Supreme
Court of Mississippi overruled the previous decisions in that
state establishing charitable immunity.
These are all recent cases, and the incidence of cases of this
type is increasing. Perhaps generalizations drawn therefrom
would be premature, but some might be made. It is to be noted
that the claimant's case is considerably more difficult when he
cannot rely upon implied warranty or statutory violation as his
theory of the action but must rely on provable negligence. Con-
siderable procedural aid would be afforded claimants if the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur should receive broad application in this
area. The courts will increasingly be faced with requests to
apply this doctrine in cases in which the plaintiff can offer
evidence from which a finding can be made that a hemolytic
reaction occurred but cannot go further and show what nature
of blood incompatibility existed or where the fault lay. The con-
clusion that a court will reach on these questions will depend to
a considerable extent on the scientific opinion presented to them
through the testimony of the experts.
Lacking these procedural aids, the claimant has the burden of
showing conduct of the hospital or blood bank which falls below
the ordinary care to be expected of persons in those professions.
88. 181 F2d 293 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
89. 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951).
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This standard is not a static one. As medical science adds new
knowledge of testing blood compatibility, and as hospitals and
blood banks establish additional procedural safeguards in the
transfusion process, the law will incorporate these procedures
into its judgment on the conduct of the persons involved.
4. Statute of Limitations
Quinton v. United States90 was another action brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act.91 The plaintiff charged that the
defendant, through its employees at Larson Air Force Base, in
Washington, negligently administered wrong type blood in
transfusions given his wife. The complaint alleged that the
plaintiff was in the Air Force stationed at Larson, that his wife
was a patient in the base hospital, and that on May 17, 1956, she
received three transfusions. It was alleged that, unknown to the
plaintiff or his wife, his wife received Rh positive blood, while
her correct blood type was Rh negative. No injury was mani-
fested after the transfusions, and plaintiff and his wife re-
mained unaware of the condition until June 1959, during the
wife's then pregnancy. As a result of the transfusion of the
wrong type blood, the wife gave birth to a stillborn child on
December 17, 1959. It was alleged that she could not safely bear
other children without, in all probability, their being stillborn,
blind, or mentally defective. The complaint was filed on August
29, 1960. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdic-
tion on the ground that the two year period of the statute of
limitations had lapsed. 92  The court held that the wrong
occurred, assuming the facts of the complaint to be true, on May
17, 1956, and hence that the statute of limitations had run. It is
to be noted that this case was decided entirely on the complaint
and the motion to dismiss so that no evidence in substantiation
of the plaintiff's case was presented. The crucial question was,
when did the claim accrue? The government contended that it
accrued when the transfusions were given, the plaintiff that it
did not accrue until June of 1959 when he gained knowledge of
the defendant's negligent act. The court held that Washington
law governed, the law of the state in which the act or omission
occurred. The court read the Washington decisions as deter-
minative that the cause of action accrued on the date of the
90. 203 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Tex. 1961).
91. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1964).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1964).
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wrong. It then reasoned that the wife had suffered immediate
injury when the wrong blood was injected into her veins, since
her capacity to bear healthy children was lost from that moment.
D. Provable Negligence-Transmission of Homologous Serum
Hepatitis
Transfusing blood known to contain hepatitis virus or failing
to screen donors using currently approved screening technigues
could lead to a finding of negligence. However, it has been held
that where transfusion is indicated, the counter-risk of hepatitis
infection need not be called to the attention of the patient. Fail-
ure to utilize recognized techniques for treating blood products
to eliminate hepatitis virus can constitute actionable negligence.
1. Transfusions with Whole Blood
No appellate court has yet considered whether a blood bank
or a hospital might be found negligent for supplying blood con-
taining the hepatitis virus. The case closest in point is Fischer
v. Wilmington General Hospital.93 This is a lower court opinion,
apparently not appealed. Since this is the only reported case, it
is presented herein in some detail. Not only the opinion of the
court but a perusal of the pleadings and affidavits in the record
has been relied upon.
The plaintiff, Mrs. Fischer, was admitted to the hospital for
treatment in connection with an incomplete abortion. Before her
scheduled operation she suffered substantial bleeding, and her
surgeon ordered the administration of 500 cc. of whole blood.
She was released in a few days but one month later was read-
mitted for treatment of viral hepatitis. She sued the hospital
for $50,000 damages, alleging that she contracted the disease as
a result of the transfusion; her husband joined in the suit, ask-
ing on his own behalf damages of $1,71 for medical expenses
and $20,000 for loss of her services.
The complaint alleged that the hospital was negligent in ad-
ministering the blood in that (a) no test was made to determine
whether the blood was infected by any foreign disease; (b) the
defendant hospital should have known that the blood was, or
could have been, infected by virus or other disease; (c) so know-
ing, the hospital failed to advise the plaintiff; (d) the hospital
failed to exercise the care required of them in that the source of
the whole blood gave them reason to believe it was infected by
93. 51 Del. 554, 149 A.2d 749 (Super. Ct. 1959).
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a virus or other disease. The hospital filed an answer admitting
administration of the blood and denying all other allegations.
Delaware has adopted rules of civil procedure based on the
Federal Rules, and pursuant to Rule 56 thereof, the defendant
filed several affidavits from doctors and specialists in blood
banking operations. The plaintiff filed counter-affidavits of
herself, her husband, and two doctors. Summary judgment can
be granted only if the sworn affidavits submitted by the moving
party clearly show that there is no question of fact involved, and
the affidavits of the answering party do not create a question
of fact by controverting propositions in the moving party's
papers. The courts are hesitant to grant summary judgment
unless there is clearly no factual question to be litigated. In the
argument on the motion, the plaintiff abandoned all of his
allegations of negligence except one, that the hospital, "'know-
ing that the said whole blood administered to the Plaintiff,
Yolanda Fischer, was, or could have been infected by a disease
or virus, failed to so advise Plaintiff, Yolanda Fischer, of its
knowledge.' ",94 Counsel for defendant argued that this allegation
confused the theory of negligence with the theory of assault and
battery; only in the latter theory of the case, it was argued, was
consent necessary to the giving of a transfusion.
The defendant's affidavits, from affiants whose background
and expertise was uncontested, said that there was no known
method by which the virus could be detected or destroyed in
whole blood; that the blood was procured under conditions
which impose all reasonable safe-guards to assure that it does
not contain the virus; that the patient had been bleeding briskly;
that hemorrhages and resulting shock were the prime cause of
maternal death in the United States; and that the danger of
fatality overrides the admitted risk of the patient's contracting
hepatitis. The affidavit of a Delaware physician, Dr. 0. N.
Stern, contained the following statement:
[I]t is not my practice or the practice generally within
the medical profession in this locality to advise patients of
the risk of such infection, since the psychological and psy-
chosomatic effect of the alarm which would be produced by
such advice would run counter to the beneficial effect sought
to be produced by the transfusion itself.95
94. Id. at 556, 149 A.2d at 750.
95. Id. at 561, 149 A.2d at 753.
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The plaintiff's counter affidavits did not controvert these
statements. Mrs. Fischer stated that no one told her that she
would receive a transfusion, nor was her consent asked. She also
stated that she didn't think she was bleeding enough to receive
a transfusion, but the court disregarded this as not being a
tenable judgment as against that of the physicians. Mr. Fischer
stated that his consent was not asked, although he was informed
that transfusion was necessary. He attempted to give his own
blood, but the transfusion was completed before his donation.
No one told him of the serious risks that might be involved in
transfusion. One doctor stated for the plaintiff that in his
opinion the jaundice did result from a blood transfusion; an-
other stated that transfusions were very serious matters and
"should not be given unless in the exercise of reasonable judg-
ment they are needed." 96
On these affidavits, the court granted summary judgment for
the defendant hospital. No support was found in the affidavits
for a finding of negligence, and the court gave its opinion that
it would constitute extreme neglect to permit the risk of serum
hepatitis to prevent the administration of a blood transfusion
when needed by the patient. Considerable reliance was placed
on the statement quoted above, that there might be risks in tell-
ing a patient of the potential danger in transfusion. The court
held that there was no legal duty to tell the patient of the risk of
hepatitis and hence, no negligence.
If a plaintiff could show that the transmission of jaundice
was caused by negligence, he could recover. Again, the applica-
tion of res ipsa loquitur would aid his problems of proof. It is
likely that recognized techniques for screening donors will
establish a standard of care, and conduct falling below this
standard would constitute a breach of duty owed to the recipient
of blood. In the Fischer case, the defense was aided by the affi-
davit of Dr. Thomas R. Boggs, Jr., associate director of the
Philadelphia Serum Exchange, who stated that there being no
known technique by which viral hepatitis may be detected in
blood, the Exchange, in conformity with practice of similar
licensed commercial blood banks, sought to exclude prospective
donors who may be carriers, by asking (a) whether they have
ever suffered any stomach cramps or pains; (b) whether they
have ever had jaundice; (c) whether they have ever had a yel-
96. Id. at 560, 149 A2d at 752.
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lowing condition of the whites of their eyes; (d) whether they
have ever been in the company of a person suffering from
jaundice. If an affirmative answer was recevied to any of the
questions, the donor was rejected. Dr. Boggs also stated that
the units involved in the Fischer transfusion had been delivered
from the Exchange and that none of the donors of this blood had
given any history of illness or symptoms of illness attributable
to viral hepatitis infection.
Perlmutter v. Beth David HospitaZ97 also involved serum
hepatitis allegedly contracted from a whole blood transfusior,.
There, however, the plaintiff did not allege negligence, arguing
solely that the blood was "sold" to her and that implied war-
ranties of quality were breached in that the blood contained
hepatitis virus.
2. Transfusions with Plasma
Three cases have arisen involving serum hepatitis allegedly
contracted through transfusions with plasma. In Merok & Com-
pany v. Kidd,98 discussed above, the theory of the plaintiff's
action was that the administration of plasma contaminated with
the virus violated the Pure Food & Drug Law of Tennessee. 99
Judgment for the plaintiff on a jury verdict based on this theory
was reversed by the appellate court. No allegation of negligence
was made. In Parker v. St ate00 and Hidy v. State 0 1 actions were
brought against the State of New York by representatives of the
deceased who had died due to receiving pooled plasma infected
with hepatitis virus. The state was allegedly at fault in that it
had knowledge of the incidence of homologous serum hepatitis
due to the use of pooled plasma and nevertheless distributed war
surplus plasma, failing to warn physicians of the danger. In
both cases it was held that the state could rely on the profes-
sional knowledge of the physicians and assume that they would
use a medical agency of limited medical usefulness under limited
conditions. Parker was an emergency transfusion case, whereas
in Hidy the patient had been in the hospital for some 15 hours
97. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
98. 242 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1957).
99. 52 TEzN. COM ANN. §§ 101-24 (1956).
100. 201 Misc. 416, 105 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Ct. CI. 1951), aff'd, 280 App. Div. 157,
112 N.Y.S.2d 695, appeal denied, 109 N.E.2d 474, 115 N.Y.S.2d 311 (1952).
101. 207 Misc. 207, 137 N.Y.S.2d 334 (Ct. CI. 1955) aff'd 2 App. Div. 2d
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prior to the transfusion, and his blood had not been typed or
cross-matched in preparation for possible emergency. The court
in Hidy strongly intimated that since both whole blood and
irradiated plasma were available, the hospital and the physician
might have been found negligent in not using one of the two.
(The case arose in the brief interval during which irradiation
was considered to be an effective method of killing the hepatitis
viras; this aspect of the case is now of interest only to indicate
how quickly new medical theories might be made the predicate
for a finding of negligence.) The court held in both cases that
the state was not liable.
As pointed out above, the failure of a hospital or blood bank
to use the six months storage at room temperature technique to
eliminate hepatitis from plasma might be held to constitute neg-
ligence. Here again, expert testimony and reference to medical
literature would dictate the result.
E. Provable Neglicence: Liability to Blood Donors
Blood banks and hospitals have a duty to exercise due care
toward donors of blood. Often, damage actions grow out of
situations in which difficulty is experienced in inserting the
needle in the vein. Failure to follow customary procedures for
avoidance of contamination can support a finding of negligence.
Donors must be given reasonable protection during their entire
visit to the hospital or blood bank.
Due care, including the exercise of ordinary professional skill,
is owed by blood banks and hospitals and their personnel to
donors of blood. Again, there exists only a relatively small
number of illustrative appellate court cases. Mrachek v. Sun-
shine Biscuit, Inc.,102 while not a blood donor case, illustrates
that the most routine drawing of blood can give rise to a sub-
stantial claim for damages. The plaintiff applied for employ-
ment with the defendant and was required to submit to a blood
test to determine whether she had a communicable disease. The
physician twice inserted the needle in her left arm, probing
beneath the skin many times, but failed to draw blood. He then
successfully drew the blood from her right arm. Her left hand
lost all feeling and developed a painful, claw-like paralysis.
She was unable to use her left hand. The trial judge found that
the physician had been negligent and awarded damages of $30,-
102. 308 N.Y. 116, 123 N.E.2d 801 (1954).
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000. This was reduced to $15,000 on appeal. The only issue
raised on the appeal was whether the employer was liable if the
physician was negligent.
In C'ow v. Saskatoon,'"° a Canadian case, the plaintiff alleg-
ed than an intern in the defendant hospital and been negligent
in taking blood from her to be used in a transfusion to her fath-
er. Her veins were very small, and difficulty was encountered in
inserting the needle. Her left arm was tried first, then her
right, then the left again. Finally because of pain the attempt
was abandoned. Her arm was dressed, and she left for home. She
was examined several times in the next several days and then
treated in the hospital for nine days for an infection. The trial
court found no evidence of negligence but held that such an infec-
tion would not have arisen without negligence on the part of the
hospital and awarded damages of $1500 to the patient and $730
to her husband. On appeal, this was reversed and judgment di-
rected for the hospital, based on the medical testimony in the
record to the effect that the taking of blood had been in accor-
dance with professional standards; one hundred donors had given
blood that week and no other infection had been reported. Furth-
er testimony showed that infection could come from outside the
body or from infection within the body. The court said that this
was a risk that every blood donor must run and refused to apply
res ispa loquitur. The gist of the ruling is that the evidence in
the record was insufficient to show that the probability that the
infection arose from negligence of the defendant was not shown
to be greater than the probability that it arose in another way.
Courts frequently say that verdicts cannot be rested on mere con-
jecture or speculation. Another court on these same facts might
have permitted the verdict to stand. 04
Brown v. S Sannon We8t Teoas MemoriaZ HospitaZor5 was
another action brought for infection in the plaintiff's arm, alleg-
edly brought about through the use of a nonsterile needle in tak-
ing a blood donation. Baylor University would send a "collecting
unit" kit including sterilized needles to the defendant hospital,
which the latter used to take blood donations. The donor plain-
tiff sustained undisputed chronic infection of her arms and found
103. [1942] 2 D.L.R. 412.
104. Compare Burens v. Industrial Comm'n, 162 Ohio St. 549, 124 N.E.2d
724 (1955) With Tennant v. Peoria & PU. Ry., 321 U.S. 29, 35 (1944) (neither
case involving blood donors).
105. 222 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1949).
[Vol. 20
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it difficult to bend her elbow after making the blood donation.
She had been given a hypodermic injection with a small needle,
after which a larger needle had been inserted to draw blood.
Great difficulty was encountered in inserting the needle in a vein;
the process took more than six minutes and was very painful.
Suit was brought against both the hospital and Baylor. The trial
court withdrew the case from the jury and ruled for both de-
fendants, and this judgment was affirmed. Again, the medi-
cal testimony determined the outcome. One doctor testified that
there was no way to determine at what time infection was intro-
duced into the arm; another, that in the absence of a culture of
the things used, the source of infection could not be determined.
The blood bank director testified that tests were run on blood
to determine whether any contamination existed and that records
made the day Mrs. Brown's blood came in showed no contamin-
ation. If the needle had been contaminated, it was argued, then
her blood would be similarly contaminated. The court held that
the plaintiff had failed to prove that the infection was caused
by a contaminated needle.
Failure to follow the customary procedure for avoidance of
contamination can support a finding of negligence. In Kalmus
v. Cedars of Lebanon Hospital,1°6 a nurse allegedly adminis-
tered a hypodermic injection with an unsterilized needle and
syringe. The plaintiff testified that the nurse gave her the in-
jection without preparing her by scrubbing her skin with an al-
cohol sponge as was the custom in the area. There was no dis-
pute that her thigh was abscessed, and direct expert testimony
was offered that use of an unsterile needle was the cause of the
abscess. The evidence was held sufficient to support the verdict
of $3,000 for the plaintiff. In Peck v. Charles B. Towns Hospi-
tal,1°07 also a hypodermic infection case, expert testimony was
introduced that the defendant's method of sterilization by boil-
ing in water was inadequate and improper by recognized stan-
dards. Further, it was testified that particular care was needed
in sterilizing equipment for injection of known drug addicts. The
dismissal of the plaintiff's case was held to have been error, and
a new trial was awarded. General Benevolent Association v. Fow-
ler'08 involved infection of a patient's arm by a piece of needle
106. 281 P2d 872 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955).
107. 275 App. Div. 302, 89 N.Y.S2d 190 (1949).
108. 210 Miss. 578, 50 So. 2d 137 (1951).
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which broke off unknown to the nurses administering glucose.
The arm swelled and discolored, and a physician later extracted
the broken piece of the hollow needle therefrom with tweezers.
The nurses testified that they had never previously seen a needle
break in this manner. The circumstantial evidence was consider-
ed sufficient to support a finding of negligence.
Donors must be given reasonable protection during their entire
visit to the hospital or blood bank. In Boll v. Sharpe & Dohme,
Io.,'1 a paid donor allegedly fell suffering permanent injuries
due to his fainting during or immediately after a blood donation.
He alleged that the company was negligent in the protection af-
forded him as a donor. The court held that he could recover if he
proved negligence, despite his having executed for the company
a covenant not to sue. The plaintiff in SaZtzer v. Reckford" °
also claimed that he fainted, the defense claiming that he had
had a convulsion. A sample of blood had been taken by a nurse
for analysis, after which the patient had informed the nurse that
he did not feel well. The nurse seated him on a stool in the mid-
dle of the room, a few feet away from a sterilizer, and left him
holding his head down. He then fell, hitting the sterilizer and re-
ceiving burns. Judgment was for the defendant based on medi-
cal testimony that the nurse was reasonable in not expecting the
patient to faint so long a time after the taking of blood.
109. 281 App. Div. 568, 121 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1953), afj'd niem., 307 N.Y. 646,
120 N.E.2d 836 (1954).
110. 319 Pa. 208, 179 A. 449 (1935).
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